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Abstract
Background: Paraguay has reportedly been a major transit hub for illicit tobacco products since the 1960s, initially
to supply markets in Argentina and Brazil and, more recently, other regional markets and beyond. However, to date
there has been no systematic analysis, notably independent of the tobacco industry, of this trade including the roles of
domestic production and transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). This article fills that gap by detailing the history of
Paraguay’s illicit cigarette trade to Brazil and Argentina of TTC products and Paraguayan production between 1960 and
2003. The effective control of illicit cigarette flows, under Article 15 of the World Health Organization (WHO)
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate the Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products, requires fuller understanding of the changing nature of the illicit trade.
Methods: We systematically searched internal industry documents to understand the activities and strategies
of leading TTCs in Paraguay and subregion over time. We also mapped illicit trade volume and patterns using
US government and UN data on the cigarette trade involving Paraguay. We then estimated Paraguay’s
cigarette production from 1989 to 2003 using tobacco leaf flows from the United Nations Commodity Trade
Statistics Database (UN Comtrade).
Results: We identify four phases in the illicit tobacco trade involving Paraguay: 1) Paraguay as a transit hub to smuggle
BAT and PMI cigarettes from the U.S. into Argentina and Brazil (from the 1960s to the mid-1970s); 2) BAT and PMI
competing in north-east Argentina (1989–1994); 3) BAT and PMI competing in southern and southern-east Brazil (mid
to late 1990s); and 4) the growth in the illicit trade of Paraguayan manufactured cigarettes (from the mid- 1990s
onwards). These phases suggest the illicit trade was seeded by TTCs, and that the system of supply and demand on
lower priced brands they developed in the 1990s created a business opportunity for manufacturing in Paraguay. Brazil’s
efforts to fight this trade, with a 150% tax on exports to Latin American countries in 1999, further prompted supply of
the illicit trade to shift from TTCs to Paraguayan manufacturers.
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Conclusion: This paper extends evidence of the longstanding complicity of TTCs in the illicit trade to this region and
the consequent growth of Paraguayan production in the 1990s. Our findings confirm the need to better understand
the factors influencing how the illicit tobacco trade has changed over time, in specific regional contexts, and amid
tobacco industry globalization. In Paraguay, the changing roles of TTC and domestic production have been central to
shifting patterns of illicit supply and distribution since the 1960s. Important questions are raised, in turn, about TTCs
efforts to participate as legitimate partners in global efforts to combat the problem, including a leading role in data
gathering and analysis.
Keywords: Paraguay, Latin America, illicit tobacco trade, transnational tobacco companies, tobacco industry,
Tobacco control

Resumen
Introducción: según informes, Paraguay ha sido un importante país de tránsito para el comercio ilícito de productos
de tabaco desde 1960, inicialmente para abastecer los mercados de Argentina y Brasil y, más recientemente, otros
mercados regionales y suprarregionales. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha, no ha habido un análisis de este comercio que
sea sistemático e independiente de la industria tabacalera, y que incluya los roles de la producción nacional y de las
empresas tabacaleras transnacionales (TTCs por sus siglas en inglés). Este artículo llena este vacío al detallar la historia
del comercio ilícito de cigarrillos - productos de las TTCs - de Paraguay con destino a Brasil y Argentina, así como la
producción paraguaya entre 1960 y 2003. El control efectivo de los flujos ilícitos de cigarrillos, según el Artículo 15 del
Convenio Marco de la OMS para el Control del Tabaco (CMCT OMS) y el Protocolo para la eliminación del comercio
ilícito de productos de tabaco, requiere una mayor comprensión de la naturaleza cambiante del comercio ilícito.
Métodos: llevamos a cabo una búsqueda sistemática en los documentos internos de la industria para entender las
actividades y estrategias de las TTCs en Paraguay a través del tiempo. También mapeamos el volumen y los patrones
de comercio internacional utilizando datos del gobierno de los EE. UU. y de las Naciones Unidas sobre el comercio de
cigarrillos involucrando a Paraguay. Luego calculamos la producción de cigarrillos de Paraguay entre 1989 y 2003
utilizando datos sobre el comercio de hojas de tabaco provenientes de la base de datos de estadísticas de comercio
internacional COMTRADE.
Resultados: identificamos cuatro fases en el comercio ilícito de tabaco que involucra a Paraguay: 1) Paraguay como
centro de tránsito para contrabandear cigarrillos de BAT y PMI de los EE. UU. a Argentina y Brasil (desde la década de
1960 hasta mediados de la década de 1970); 2) BAT y PMI compitiendo en el noreste de Argentina (1989-1994); 3) BAT
y PMI compitiendo en el sur y sureste de Brasil (mediados a fines de la década de 1990); y 4) el crecimiento del
comercio ilícito de cigarrillos fabricados en Paraguay (desde mediados de la década de 1990 hasta 1998). Estas fases
sugieren que el comercio ilícito fue facilitado por las TTCs, y que el sistema de oferta y demanda de marcas de bajo
precio que desarrollaron en la década de 1990 creó una oportunidad de comercio para la fabricación en Paraguay. Los
esfuerzos de Brasil para combatir este comercio con un impuesto del 150% sobre las exportaciones a los países
latinoamericanos en 1999, impulsaron aún más el paso de la oferta del comercio ilícito de las manos de las TTCs a los
fabricantes paraguayos.
Conclusión: este artículo aporta evidencia adicional sobre la complicidad de larga data de las TTCs en el
comercio ilícito dentro la región y del crecimiento de la producción paraguaya en los años noventa. Nuestros
hallazgos confirman la necesidad de una mejor comprensión de los factores que han influido en los cambios del
comercio ilícito de productos de tabaco a través del tiempo, dentro de contextos regionales específicos y en
medio de la globalización de la industria tabacalera. En Paraguay, los roles cambiantes de las TTCs y de la
producción nacional han sido fundamentales para modificar los patrones de oferta y distribución desde los años
sesenta. A su vez, se plantean preguntas importantes sobre los esfuerzos de la industria para participar como
socios legítimos en los esfuerzos globales para combatir el problema, incluido un papel principal en la
recopilación y el análisis de datos.
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Background
The illicit tobacco trade1 remains a major problem
worldwide despite the successful legal prosecution of
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in several jurisdictions [1–3], creation of regional initiatives to tackle
the issue [4–8], the ratification of the World Health
Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (article 15), and the entry into
force of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. According to Joossens and Raw [9], one
of nine (11.6%) cigarettes smoked worldwide is illicit.
This trade undermines tobacco control efforts including
higher taxes by increasing the affordability of tobacco
products [10–12]. Increasing affordability leads to more
consumption of cigarettes, especially among the poor
and youth. This, in turn, increases the incidence of
tobacco-related disease and death. One conservative estimate is that eliminating the global illicit tobacco trade
would save approximately 164,000 lives annually from 2030
onwards, with 32,000 lives saved in high-income countries
and 132,000 in low- and middle-income countries [12]. In
relation to tax revenues, governments lose an estimated US$40.5 billion per year due to cigarette smuggling
[12].
Cigarette smuggling has previously been identified as
playing an important role in the arrival of TTCs in Latin
America, facilitating the takeover of domestic companies
between the 1960s and 1980s. Shepherd [13, 14] identified
TTCs as complicit in smuggling their own products into
previously closed markets in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC). Millions of pages of internal industry documents, released from the mid-1990s by
whistle-blowers and through US litigation, provided
further evidence of these strategies in LAC [15–19] and
other regions [20–24]. Despite these revelations, and litigation against TTCs [25–27], Latin America remains “plagued by illicit tobacco” [28]. The region is described as
having one of the highest levels of illicit tobacco product
penetration in the world [29, 30].
Paraguay has reportedly been a major transit hub for
illicit tobacco products in the region since the 1960s.
Today, Paraguay is reported to be the largest supplier of
illicit cigarettes in the region. A 2002 study of the business
strategies of Philip Morris International (PMI)2 and British
American Tobacco (BAT) in the LAC region, commissioned by the Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO), reported “the industry’s knowledge of and participation in the distribution of cigarettes through illegal
channels” [18]. A study of the economics of tobacco control in Brazil, using official trade data on cigarettes and tobacco leaf between Brazil and other Mercosur countries
from the 1990s to the early 2000s, identified unusually
high levels of cigarettes stocks in Paraguay beginning in
the 1990s [31]. A 2009 study by Ramos [32], which
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analyses the illicit cigarette trade in Mercosur countries3
during the 2000s, provides the most comprehensive data
to date. The study describes a production boom in
Paraguay, along with estimated volumes of illicit trade in
local brands, using data on official trade and seizures by
law enforcement, public documents, and media sources.
Investigative journalists have provided further evidence
suggesting Paraguayan involvement in the illicit tobacco
trade. In its Tobacco Underground series [33], the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)
reported on Paraguay’s emergence as “a top producer of
contraband tobacco” [34, 35]. The election of Tabesa’s
founder Horacio Cartes as President of Paraguay in 2013
prompted allegations in Brazilian newspapers Gazeta do
Povo [36] and Folha de São Paulo [37]; Colombian
newspapers El Tiempo [38–42] and El Espectador [43];
and Insight Crime [44–46]. The articles reported on
Paraguay’s increasing cigarette production, smuggling
routes, and relationship with organized crime in the region based on official data from the Paraguayan and Brazilian governments, and interviews conducted in the
tri-border (Paraguay-Brazil-Argentina) area, including
with BAT and PMI representatives.
To date, there has been limited scholarly analysis of
Paraguay and the illicit tobacco trade over time. Existing
studies focus on the illicit trade and tobacco control in
neighbouring countries or the region as a whole. For example, using estimates of per capita cigarette consumption
in Brazil and Paraguay between the early 1970s and late
1990s, and the illicit market in Brazil, Shafey et al. report
that a large proportion of cigarettes legally exported from
Brazil to Paraguay appeared to return to Brazil illegally
[47]. Similarly, using data on prices, sales and trade, Sáenz
de Miera-Juárez and Iglesias argue that Brazilian companies became complicit in the illicit market during the 1990s
in response to declining local demand for higher-priced
taxed legal products. They write that Brazilian companies
increased legal (tax exempt) exports to Paraguay for the
purpose of increasing the volume of illegal re-exports back
to Brazil tax free. The authors conclude that Brazilian
measures to curtail re-exports in the late 1990s came too
late. By the early 2000s, Paraguayan factories were able to
supply their own manufactured cigarettes to the illicit export market to Brazil [48].
While available sources provide important evidence of
Paraguay’s role as a major source of illicit tobacco products to Brazil and Argentina, there is no detailed study
to date of the history of the tobacco industry in
Paraguay, and its development into a regional producer
for “cheap whites” since the mid-1990s. This paper aims
to fill this gap by: a) analysing the complicity of TTCs in
seeding this trade from the 1960s; b) explaining why and
how Paraguayan manufacturers became involved in the
trade from the 1990s; and c) describing the rapid growth
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in Paraguay an manufacturing and export from the
mid-1990s. In this way, this article contributes better understanding of the role of Paraguay in the changing nature of the illicit tobacco trade. Joossens and Raw [9]
argue that, while the main form of illicit trade during
the 1980s and 1990s was large-scale smuggling of TTC
brands, other modes have since emerged in the form
of “illegal manufacturing, including counterfeiting and
the emergence of new cigarette brands, produced in a
rather open manner at well-known locations, which are
only or mainly intended for the illegal market of another
country” [9]. Understanding more fully the economic
factors that have shaped current nature of illicit trade, in
turn, informs effective implementation of Article 15 of
the FCTC and the Protocol to Eliminate the Illicit Trade
in Tobacco Products.

Methods
We began by reviewing the existing English, Spanish,
and Portuguese-language literature to identify what is
known about Paraguay and the illicit tobacco trade. We
searched the mass media using Lexis-Nexis and Google;
the scholarly literature using JSTOR, Google Scholar,
and PubMed; and the grey literature using Google, key
informants, and snowballing technique. These sources
were used to triangulate findings from other data
sources to enhance validity and reliability.
To understand the activities and strategies of TTCs in
Paraguay and the region, we systematically searched the
Truth Tobacco Industry Documents (TTID) collection
using the keywords ‘Paraguay’ and ‘Tabesa’, combined
with ‘smuggling’, ‘contraband’, and known euphemisms
for illicit trade, namely ‘DNP’ (duty not paid), ‘transit’,
and ‘General Trade’ (GT) [21, 49]. The snowball technique was used to generate additional keywords from
reviewed documents, largely names of individuals, companies, projects and brands. Around 3000 documents
were reviewed, of which 135 were found to be relevant
to the themes of this analysis. The documents are from
BAT, due to their legal provenance and relatively candid
nature compared to other TTC internal documents
available [50], thus offering particular insights on the
company’s own activities, along with its subsidiaries and
partners during the 1990s. The focus on BAT documents
was also justified by its dominant position in the region’s
cigarette markets. At the same time, the documents
reviewed describe PMI strategies and activities albeit from
BAT’s perspective. In available BAT documents, for example, blame for the first illegal tobacco movements in the
region is placed on PMI, while BAT portrays itself as
obliged to react to PMI’s actions. We do not have independent evidence to confirm which company initiated the
illicit tobacco trade in northeast Argentina and Brazil.
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Instead, we document how both TTCs competitively participated in the illicit trade, as reflected in trade volumes
over time. First, we discuss the reasons why BAT was interested in entering the illicit market independently of
PMI’s actions. These explanations go beyond the existing
literature, such as PAHO (2002) which concludes that PMI
initiated, and BAT reacted without noting that the only
available documents were from BAT. Second, we use publicly available trade data to show trade movements in a
more comprehensive way than previously documented.
For the relevant documents, we followed Forster’s hermeneutic approach to analysing company documents
which emphasises reliability, contextualization and validation [51, 52]. Forster incorporates identification of
meaning and categorization themes; interpretation and
contextualization within geographical, temporal and corporate culture contexts; triangulating with other resources to broaden understanding of issues described;
and validation of findings. Using this approach, we organized documents by date, combined with information
from scholarly and secondary sources, and then iteratively reviewed to build a narrative.
In addition, we triangulated findings from the TTID,
by estimating volumes of illicit trade by compiling official data on cigarette exports and imports between
Paraguay and its trading partners using the United Nations Commodity Trade Stratistics Database (UN Comtrade). For the 1960s and 1970s, when UN Comtrade
data is unavailable, we used data from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Circular and other US government agricultural services
sources. Given the lack of official data on cigarette production and grey literature on activities of Paraguayan
cigarette firms, we estimated Paraguayan cigarette production from 1989 to 2003, as the local industry began to
emerge. This gave us an assessment of the growth and aggregate dimension of Paraguayan’s firm activities, given
that TTCs had no production facilities during the 1990s.
For this purpose, we collected data on tobacco leaf exports
and imports to Paraguay from UN Comtrade (see Appendix for further explanation of our methodology).

Results
We identify four phases in the illicit tobacco trade involving Paraguay: 1) Paraguay as a transit hub for smuggling BAT and PMI cigarettes from the U.S. into
Argentina and Brazil (from the 1960s to the mid-1970s);
2) BAT and PMI competing in the north-east of
Argentina (1989–1994); 3) BAT and PMI competing in
southern and south-eastern Brazil (mid to late 1990s);
and 4) growth in the illicit trade of Paraguayan manufactured cigarettes (from the mid-1990s). We describe each
of these phases to understand why and how the illicit
trade in the region has changed over time, including the
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role of TTC complicity in the 1990s, which created a
business opportunity for Paraguayan tobacco companies.
The main Paraguayan company emerging from this
process, of growing production and illicit sales, was Tabacalera del Este, known as Tabesa. A detailed analysis of
the expansion of its manufacturing capacity since the
late 1990s, to become a leading regional, and increasingly global, source of illicit tobacco products is presented in an accompanying paper (Gomis B, Lee K,
Carillo Botero N, Shepherd P, Iglesias R: “We think
globally”: the rise of Paraguay’s Tabacalera del Este as a
threat to global tobacco control, forthcoming).
A strategic location for TTCs to “re-export to other
countries” during the 1960s and 1970s

Documents suggest Paraguay became a hub for the illicit
tobacco trade during the 1960s when TTCs began to use
the country to introduce US brands into the sub region.
While generating immediate revenues was desired, the
ultimate purpose of this trade was to facilitate the takeover of local firms in major markets in the LAC region
with potential for substantial growth notably in
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela [14]. Analysing this
strategy, Shepherd [14] found that, in addition to conventional methods for growing foreign markets (i.e. legal
exports, licensing, joint ventures, acquisitions), TTCs
used contraband channels to “soften up” local markets
[53]. By channeling their brands into these markets via
the illicit trade, TTCs effectively competed with and
eventually weakened local companies [13, 14].
The initial supply route for US-manufactured cigarettes,
during the 1960s, was to be first legally exported to small,
intermediary “free trade zones” or countries like Paraguay,
the Netherlands Antilles, and Panama. Available data suggests such exports would be five to ten times the level of
potential consumption locally [14]. The cigarettes were
then illegally re-exported in large quantities to their final
destination in nearby protected markets –Argentina and
Brazil in the case of Paraguay [14].
Available data suggests that, before the early 1960s,
Paraguay was not a major market for US cigarette exports. Paraguay was not among the fifty countries listed
as export markets in 1957–58 [54]. From the early
1960s, exports to Paraguay began to grow rapidly, climbing to almost 2 billion sticks annually by 1968 and 1969
[55]. Paraguay had become the leading importer of US
cigarettes in Latin America [56], and among the top four
worldwide between 1965 and 1968 [57, 58].
Table 1 describes this growth alongside an estimate of
the amounts of illicit trade into Argentina from the 1960s
to the mid-1970s. It highlights two important points. First,
levels of US exports far outpaced the consumption capacity of Paraguayans. The population of Paraguay aged
15–64 years was around 1 million in 1965 and 1.25
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Table 1 The rise of Paraguay as an illicit transit hub from the
US to Argentina in the 1960s
Year

Cigarette
US legal cigarette
production
exports to Paraguay
in Paraguay
(million sticks)
(million sticks)

Estimated cigarette
contraband in
Argentina
(million sticks)a

1951–60 avg 494

No Data

520

1961

435

169

3200

1962

480

49

200

1963

422

204

2000

1964

520

684

2400

1965

598

967

1600

1966

574

1270

2400

1967

418

1423

3000

1968

366

1770

3800

1969

346

742

4000

1970

366

574

3600

1971

400

560

3200

1972

640

216

800

1973

620

549

1800

1974

630

865

1000

1975

640

783

No data

1976

650

804

No data

1977

No data

684

No data

1978

No data

856

No data

Sources: Cigarette Production in Paraguay: USDA, Foreign Agriculture Service,
World Tobacco Analysis: Consumer Marketing, February, 1958
USDA, Foreign Agricultural Circular-Tobacco, various years, 1958-77
US legal cigarette exports to Paraguay: USDA, Foreign Agricultural CircularTobacco, various years, 1960-63
USDA, Foreign Agricultural Circular-Tobacco, various years, 1963-1978
USDA, Economic Research Service, Tobacco Situation, various years 1967-1990
a
Estudio Sur, Estudio de la demanda de tabaco nacional , Buenos Aires, 1975,
Cuadro A-17: 24 and Anexo C, Cuadro C-4: 81

million in 1970 [59]. US exports to Paraguay peaked at
1.77 billion sticks in 1968, representing per capita consumption of between 1416 and 1770 sticks. This level of
consumption would not have been impossible, with US
adult consumption for instance at around 2800 sticks per
capita, and around 1260 sticks in 1966 and 1280 sticks in
1967 in Argentina [60]. However, this was unlikely for
Paraguay, which had at the time a much lower GDP per
capita than Argentina. Instead, the intended end market
for American exports to Paraguay is suggested in a 1962
Brown&Williamson document which describes “American
cigarettes…imported into Paraguay on an intransit basis,
for re-export to other markets” [61].
Second, the dramatic rise in US exports to Paraguay
coincided with the “denationalization” and gradual takeover of local tobacco companies in Argentina by TTCs
[14]. From 1964 to 1971, as TTCs, except BAT, steadily
bought up Argentine companies, Paraguay was listed by
the USDA as among the top destinations for US exports.

Iglesias et al. Globalization and Health

(2018) 14:111

Page 6 of 16

Once denationalization was completed in the early
1970s – with an industry of 5–7 major tobacco companies progressively reduced to two main ones, BAT and
PMI [14], Paraguay disappeared from the list [62]. Two
detailed studies corroborate the trends illustrated in
Table 1. They point to a significant influx of contraband
cigarettes into Argentina before PMI’s’ entry in the country around 1966, a brief period of continued smuggling
thereafter to establish their international brands, and then
a marked reduction in the 1970s [63]. In short, the data
suggests that TTC exports were closely linked to the goal
of taking over the local industry in Argentina.
Notably, these fluctuations in the illicit trade during
this period did not seem to have an impact on production in Paraguay. As Table 1 (Column 2) shows, until the
end of the 1970s, Paraguay’s domestic output of cigarettes was small and most likely consumed locally.
Paraguay produced the lowest percentage of filter cigarettes (1–3%) out of 73 countries from 1965 to 1971
[64]. This modest production of mostly unfiltered cigarettes suggests Paraguay’s local industry unlikely played
a major role in the illicit trade during this period [3].
Evidence suggests there were no major smuggling activities using Paraguay as a transit hub between the mid-1970s
and end of the eighties. In those years, PMI was established
in Brazil and Argentina, producing brands formerly smuggled. BAT consolidated its dominant position in both markets, in some cases acquiring new local companies (i.e.
Piccardo in Argentina), and fully incorporating international
brands in to the subsidiary’s portfolio to influence the taste
of smokers aiming to consume “sophisticated” international
brands, such as Pall Mall and Lucky Strike in Argentina.

The battle for the north-eastern Argentinean market via
Paraguay (1989–1994)

In 1989, the Argentinean economy experienced a combination of hyperinflation and output contraction, which severely depressed the purchasing power of its population [65].
This crisis pushed smokers towards cheaper cigarettes.

According to BAT documents, PMI decided to develop a
DNP (duty not paid, an industry euphemism for contraband
market in Argentina to increase domestic supply of cheaper
cigarettes. The DNP market was further expanded in 1990,
“with growing exploitation by Philip Morris (with exports
from Paraguay) of brands such as Master, Palace and Mont
Blanc.... PMI share of the DNP low segment [cheaper brands]
reached 87%” [66]. Meanwhile, PMI still dominated the
higher-priced illicit market as well: “The DNP high segment
represents 50% of total DNP volume and Marlboro is also
the leading brand in the total DNP segment in Argentina.
Practically all of this volume arrives via Paraguay” [66].
BAT documents describe how the company initially
sought to counteract PMI by increasing the legal sales of
low-priced Ritz brand cigarettes in southern Brazil, allowing their purchase by Argentinean traders [67]. By the end
of 1990, however, BAT subsidiaries agreed to scale up of
supplies to Argentina via Paraguay. BAT Brazilian subsidiary Souza Cruz “decided to initiate ‘exports’ of Ritz
through the DNP route. This action was taken with the
knowledge of [BAT Argentinean subsidiary] Nobleza Piccardo”[67]. By the end of 1992, Souza Cruz had “reversed
the dominance of the DNP low price segment by Philip
Morris, raising its share of the segment from 33% in 1990
to 68% by the end of 1992” [67].
Table 2 shows the evolution of the cigarette trade, from
Brazil and the US to Paraguay, from 1989 to 1994. The
table points to four key findings. First, imports reported
by Paraguay from Brazil and the US account for almost all
reported cigarette imports (87–98%) during this period.
Second, there are major discrepancies in imports reported
by Paraguay and exports reported by Brazil and the US.
This difference, according to Merriman (2003) and others4
[68, 69], suggests illicit activity. Notably, Paraguay reported less than seven metric tonnes of imports from
Brazil between 1989 and 1994, while Brazil reported over
21,000 metric tonnes of exports to Paraguay. In 1989 and
1990, the US reported no cigarette exports to Paraguay,
while Paraguay reported over 3300 metric tonnes of
cigarette imports from the US.

Table 2 Illicit trade from Brazil and US via Paraguay in the early 1990s
Cigarettes from Brazil

Cigarettes from the USA

Brazil + USA

Exports to PGY
reported by BRA

Imports from BRA
reported by PGY

Exports to PGY
reported by USA

Imports from USA
reported by PGY

Imports from BRA &
USA reported by PGY

All imports
reported
by PGY

All imports reported by
PGY (in billion sticks)a

1989

401

0

0

1566

1566

1632

1.6

1990

1365

0

0

1759

1759

1787

1.7

1991

2586

0

2478

3877

3877

3995

3.8

1992

5703

5

2196

3277

3282

3747

3.6

1993

11,118

2

2594

3488

3490

3668

3.5

Source: UN Comtrade, HS Code 240220: ‘Cigarettes; containing tobacco’
In metric tonnes
a
Conversion from metric tonnes to cigarettes: 1 kg = 956.4 cigarettes [31]
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Third, while the US remained a major cigarette exporter to
Paraguay during this period, Brazil took over as Paraguay’s
main supplier by 1992, exporting over four times more
cigarettes to Paraguay than the US did in 1993.
Fourth, population or income growth alone cannot account for the increased flow of cigarettes to Paraguay
between 1989 and 1993. The Paraguayan adult population (15 or above) grew from 1.7 to 1.85 million [70],
while the country’s GDP per capita increased by 9.8%.
On this basis, the expected growth of the domestic market for imported cigarettes would have been approximately 19.4%.5 Instead, Table 2 shows reported imports
more than doubling, from 1.6 to 3.5 billion sticks [71].
Documents suggest that the subsequent rapid increase
in exports, to Argentina via Paraguay by BAT Brazillian
subsidiary Souza Cruz, created conflict its Argentinian
subsidiary Nobleza Piccardo, warning that illicit sales of
Ritz in Argentina would “prejudic[e] the market share and
profitability of both the Group and [Nobleza Piccardo]”
[18, 66]. BAT responded to these tensions by launching
the Pampa Project in 1992, forming an internal group to
analyse the optimal share of the illicit market between the
two subsidiaries to maximize BAT profit [18]. Souza Cruz
and Nobleza Piccardo agreed to “[c]onstruct and implement specific marketing actions with a view to maximizing group profit from the DNP trade [and] leverage [BAT]
Group long-standing strength in the DNP region” [66]. In
late 1992, the Pampa Project proposed:
1) Export Jockey Club [produced in Brazil] to Paraguay …
for re import to the N.E of Argentina…2) Exploit the
existing Derby franchise with the ‘slims’ version,
produced in Brazil exported to Paraguay for distribution
in the N.E.A…and 3) Fulfil the market demand in the
DNP low segment with Ritz and Belmont … in order
to achieve a market share of 75% [66].
Company analysis of the financial implications of these
proposals determined that high volume and prices for
Jockey Club and Derby would be needed to achieve reasonable profit. As this was deemed not feasible at the
time, it was agreed in 1993 to maintain the status quo in
the illicit Argentinean market [67, 72–75]. The status
quo for Souza Cruz and Nobleza Piccardo was continued exports to Paraguay for illegal re-export purposes.
Brazilian exports to Paraguay almost doubled in 1992–
1993, reaching 11,000 metric tonnes or more than 10
billion sticks (Table 2). Documents describe Souza Cruz
and Nobleza Piccardo continuing to “recycle…products
through Paraguay and back into their respective markets
making use of lower excise rates in Paraguay” [71, 76].
For BAT, illicit cigarettes in the region were seen as a
“fact of life and almost institutionalized” [77], and the
illicit
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“[r]e-export of a wide range of goods has been a
traditional source of business in Paraguay’s economic
history….The significant difference in excise tax
among neighbouring countries in the southern cone
region, will continue to encourage DP imports into
Paraguay to be followed by DNP re-exportation” [71].
For Paraguayan domestic manufacturers, the supply
route for illicit cigarettes to Brazil and Argentina created
by TTCs offered a new business opportunity. A 1993
BAT document suggets the company became aware that
Paraguayan companies had also begun to supply the illicit
markets into Brazil and Argentina:
Approximately 100 Mns. US International brands of
US manufacture and legally imported into Paraguay
cross into Argentina as contraband monthly. Philip
Morris accounts for most of this business, mainly
Marlboro…. Approximately 200 Mns. cigarettes of
Brazilian manufacture per month use Paraguay as a
route into Argentina (not paying Paraguayan taxes on
route). Souza Cruz hold 70 p.c. [percent] of this
business, mainly Ritz. Paraguayan local brands are
also reported to enter Argentina illegally,
approximately 20 Mns per month [71].
A 1994 BAT document identifies Paraguayan company
La Vencedora (LVA) as part of the illicit market in Brazil
holding at least 20% of the market, mainly in sales of Pink
Hollywood [78]. Notably, the ability of Paraguayan manufacturers to compete in the illicit trade challenged a previously documented strategy used elsewhere by TTCs - to
create an illicit market when needed to access a closed
market; increase demand for and sales of their brands; and
then close the market in response to a change in government policy, in order to exclude competitors [79]. In
Argentina, BAT understood that “we must be prepared to
vacate the D.N.P segment completely without leaving a vacuum which…competitors are better placed to fill than ourselves” [80]. The post-exit strategy was to continue legally
supplying the region, as “customer franchise” had been developed. BAT considered itself in a position to open and
close the illicit market in future if necessary [80].
However, the low-priced segment of the illicit market
in Argentina was different. BAT recognized that, although “Ritz enjoyed significant consumer preference”,
“the principal consumer purchasing motivator in the
DNP low price [segment was] price” [66]. There were
other lower-priced competitors in the market:
…when Ritz was not available the consumer switched
brands, in order of preference, to falsified Ritz
(Paraguay), P[hilip] Morris brands and finally other
Paraguayan brands. This was demonstrated recently
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when temporary shortages of Ritz (S. Cruz) were
experienced due to strikes by Brazilian Receita Federal
(Customs Authorities) [66].
In short, new competitors (including Paraguayan companies LVA and Boquerón) were now recognized as producing
low-priced brands, and competing with TTCs in the subregion’s illicit market.
The fight for market share in Brazil and the “triangular
scheme”

The so-called ‘triangular scheme’ in the 1990s consisted
of exporting Brazilian cigarettes to Paraguay, particularly
after 1993, and illegally reintroducing those products in
the Brazilian market [31, 32, 48]. The Brazilian illicit
cigarette market grew rapidly from approximately half a
billion sticks in 1992 to 8 billion sticks in 1993 [81].
Three factors explain BAT’s decision to increase its
complicity in the illicit trade, through legal exports from
Brazil to Paraguay and illegal illegal re-export back to
Brazil.
The first factor was related to competition between BAT
and PMI. BAT’s Brazilian subsidiary, Souza Cruz, alleged
that it entered into the illicit market in response to PMI’s
efforts to increase market share by selling lower-priced
brands through legal and illegal channels [82–84]:
[F]rom October 1993 onwards Souza Cruz is planning
to carefully step-up its DNP efforts with a view to
achieving a competitive share in the segment. A full
brand portfolio is being launched, composed of international and local offers with competitive edge against
PM brands [82].
BAT’s goal was to achieve a 40% share of the illegal
market by 1998 [81]. Although Souza Cruz’s official
position was that PMI made the first move into the
Brazilian illicit market, the BAT subsidiary also recognised that PMI was, in part, responding to the introduction of Derby, produced by BAT’s Argentine
subsidiary Nobleza Piccardo, into the Brazilian “transit
business” [83]. PMI itself then launched Dallas in the
first half of 1993, after increasing exports to Paraguay
earlier that year, as part of a portfolio of brands for
the illicit Brazilian market [82]. In response, Souza
Cruz moved forward its plans to launch Derby in
Brazil – including in the illicit market - from 1995 to
1993, and “implement[ed] several actions” to control
PMI’s share of the illicit market [82, 85].
The second factor was the depressed economic climate.
The 1990 recession in Brazil led to a decline in cigarette
sales. On top of that, Souza Cruz and PMI increased retail
prices over inflation rates in late 1991 to restore profit
margins [82, 86]. Real price increases, alongside economic
stagnation, reduced the purchasing power of smokers and
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thus legal sales. In addition, Souza Cruz reported that
smaller Brazilian companies such as Sudan, Cibrasa, and
Ciamerica had underreported their tax obligations, and
thus were able to sell at lower prices, gaining a price advantage over Souza Cruz by the end of 1992 [87]. Souza
Cruz’s market share declined from 82.2% in 1992 to 78.8%
in 1993, with lost market share going to PMI and Brazilian
companies [83]. Documents suggest BAT responded to
these developments by increasing the supply of its brands
through the illicit trade.
A third factor was increasing competition from Paraguayan cigarettes. A BAT document describes growing
sales by Paraguayan companies in the tri-border region,
notably Ciudad del Este, competing with each other [88],
and threatening to take market share from TTCs in Brazil.
Paraguayan sales were comprised of two types of products:
counterfeits (e.g. Souza Cruz brands Ritz and Minister copied by Boquerón) and licensed brands intended for exclusive sale in Paraguay (e.g. BAT brands Pink Hollywood,
Continental and Advanced, manufactured under license by
LVA). Both types of brands were now entering the Brazilian market illegally, competing alongside TTCs in southern
Brazil [76, 89–93]. In a letter to Keith Dunt (BAT), Flavio
de Andrade (Souza Cruz) noted unsuccessful legal actions
against Boqueron to stop the counterfeiting of Souza Cruz
brands in Paraguay [82, 89, 94]. However, on BAT’s suggestion to withdraw Ritz from Ciudad del Este, de Andrade
wrote that this “could create a favourable condition for
Boquerón to increase [illicit] sales in the Brazilian market,
without competition, threatening Souza Cruz’s domestic
sales” [85].
Documents suggest BAT’s response to licensed brands
produced by LVA was different. The idea of partnering, or
even acquiring, parts of the company had been discussed
since the mid-1970s [95–100]. BAT’s interest in investing
in Paraguay was not related to a growing domestic market,
but “purely defensive” [78]6 to block LVA’s access to the
Argentinean and Brazilian markets. Internal correspondence and visit reports from the 1990s describe prolonged
and difficult negotiations with LVA, hinging on two issues:
the recovery of trademarks (licensed to LVA in the 1970s)
and the need to protect BAT’s place in the sub-regional
market (Brazil and Argentina) after the signing of
Mercosur in 1991 [76, 82, 93, 101].
Souza Cruz perceived other suppliers in the increasingly crowded illicit market, not only as a competitive
threat, but as an opportunity to advocate for lower excise taxes on tobacco products. Documents describe the
company seeking to convince Brazilian authorities to reduce excise taxes in order to lower the price of legal
brands, arguing that this would discourage the sale of
cheap illegal cigarettes [82]. Sáenz de Miera-Juárez and
Iglesias [48] analyse the coordinated strategy by Souza
Cruz and PMI during the early 1990s. They found that,
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between 1991 and 1993, both Souza Cruz and PMI increased cigarette prices in real terms, and the maintained prices at a higher level than in the 1980s. In 1993,
Souza Cruz and PMI then increased tax-free exports to
Paraguay, which were then re-exported illegally back to
Brazil. These illicit cigarettes offered a cheaper option to
smokers than domestically taxed legal cigarettes. Meanwhile, the two companies lobbied the Brazilian government to lower excise taxes on cigarettes, claiming that
this would reduce the illegal market [81]. In June 1999,
the Brazilian government finally reduced the excise tax
per pack (from approximately 40% of retail price to
about 25% [4, 86]) and authorities kept rates low in real
terms into the mid-2000s, in the belief that this would
discourage smuggling.
The increased presence of TTCs in Brazil from the
1990s led to another shift in the sub-region’s illicit trade.
Official trade data points to an increase in volume of
trade, as well as trade partners (Table 3). Although Brazilian exports to Paraguay during the 1990s have been
previously documented [31, 47], what has not been analysed to date is the farther reach of the triangular
scheme. Brazil not only exported higher quantities than
Paraguayans could consume domestically, but also
exported to Uruguay on a similar scale [31]. In addition
to Brazil and the US (already accounting for almost all
cigarette exports to Paraguay between 1989 and 1993 as
shown in Table 2), Uruguay and Argentina began

exporting large quantities of cigarettes to Paraguay between 1994 and 2002 (Table 3). The four countries
accounted for almost all cigarette imports by Paraguay
during those eight years.
Three observations can be drawn from Table 3. First,
the flow of cigarettes to Paraguay grew substantially between 1993 and 1998 (146% increase in reported exports
and 883% increase in reported imports). This was notably related to the increased use of Paraguay as a transit
hub for illicit tobacco by Argentina and Uruguay [31].
Cigarette shipments from Argentina to Paraguay, as reported by both partners, jumped between 1993 and 1994
and then remained stable until 2000. Documents suggest
Nobleza Piccardo decided to export Derby and Jockey
Club brands to Paraguay in late 1993, for re-export back
to Argentina, in order to challenge the dominance of
PMI in the northeast Argentine market [102]. The US,
already a major exporter of cigarettes to Paraguay since
1991 ([71], Table 1, Table 2), continued to supply the
Paraguayan market in excessive quantities until 1998
(consumption in Paraguay at the time was around 3 billion sticks) [71].
Second, the Brazilian government introduced a 150%
tax on cigarette exports to LAC countries in 1999, with
the aim of discouraging the re-report of those cigarettes
via the illicit trade [4, 31]. This effectively put an end to
the TTCs’ triangular scheme. Between 1994 and 1998.
Brazil had become Paraguay’s main source of cigarette

Table 3 The expansion of the illicit trade in Brazil through Paraguay
Tobacco products
from Brazil

Tobacco products
from Argentina

Tobacco products
from the U.S

Tobacco products
from Uruguay

Total

Total imports
reported by
PGY from all
trade partners
worlwide

Exports to
Imports
PGY reported from BRA
by BRA
reported
by PGY

Exports
to PGY
reported
by ARG

Imports
from ARG
reported
by PGY

Exports
to PGY
reported
by USA

Imports Exports Imports
reported to PGY
reported
by PGY
reported by PGY
by URY

Exports to
Imports In metric In billion
PGY reported reported tonnes
sticksa
by BRA, ARG, by PGY
US, URY

1993 11,118

2

33

47

2594

3488

0

12

13,745

3549

3668

3.5

1994 13,309

3263

1218

1813

1986

3511

0

32

16,513

8619

9025

8.6

1995 17,838

16,041

1633

2439

2200

3646

163

320

21,834

22,446

22,811

21.8

1996 12,920

24,727

1342

2167

1910

2839

3636

3340

19,808

33,073

33,745

32.3

1997 19,436

25,690

1687

2625

2239

3343

3333

4289

26,695

35,947

36,923

35.3

1998 23,355

22,093

1536

2128

2292

2152

6662

8519

33,845

34,892

35,452

33.9

1999 616

4171

2554

2983

983

1055

6434

8003

10,587

16,212

16,659

15.9

2000 0

45

1905

2147

No data in 887
volume

6084

6824

7989

9903

10,321

9.9

2001 0

2

0

0

No data in 694
volume

5489

4865

5489

5561

6132

5.9

2002 0

0

38

22

No data in 155
volume

4669

4496

4707

4673

4865

4.7

Source: UN Comtrade, HS Code 240220: ‘Cigarettes; containing tobacco’
In metric tonnes
a
Conversion from metric tons to cigarettes =1 kg = 956.4 cigarettes [31]
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imports, sending four to seven times the volume of
Paraguayan cigarette consumption [71]. The tax had the
expected effect of sharply reducing Brazilian exports to
Paraguay (Table 3).
Third, Uruguay became a major exporter to
Paraguay. Between 1996 and 1998, Uruguay was second only to Brazil in exports to Paraguay, with volumes almost three times Paraguayan domestic
consumption. Then from 1999, following the adoption
of a new export tax by the Brazilian government,
Uruguay became Paraguay’s leading export source.
Uruguayan company Monte Paz manufactured most of
these cigarettes, with Brazil as their final destination
via the illicit trade [47].
“A vacuum which our competitors are better placed to fill
than ourselves” [80]: The boom of Paraguayan cigarette
production after 1994

By 1994, TTCs no longer considered Paraguayan cigarettes
as minor competition, but instead as a growing threat to
their market share. As explained in the previous section,
cheaper brands sold by TTCs in the illicit market did not
compete on the basis of brand loyalty but on price. Lowpriced Paraguayan brands started competing by price with
TTC brands in northeast Argentina. In the mid 1990s,
growing production capacity was being developed by Paraguayan companies. Milton Cabral (Abifumo, Brazilian Tobacco Industry Association) mentions the growth of
Paraguayan cigarette companies during the 1990s in a
2001 seminar organized by the Brazilian Federal Revenue
Secretariat [103]. Cabral identified two periods of growth:
1994–1996 when the number of cigarette factories in
Paraguay and Uruguay increased from 6 to 12; and 2000–
2001 when factories increased from 17 to 29. However,
there has been limited independent research [32] of this
growth, largely due to the lack of available government or
company data on production.
Based on new methodology (described in Appendix),
this paper (Table 4) provides estimates of cigarette production in Paraguay between 1989 and 2003. This data
Table 4 The boom of cigarette production in Paraguay
Period
Before 1994

1994–1998

1999–2003

Years

Estimated average annual cigarette
production (billion sticks)

1989–1992

1.20

1993

2.70

1994–1995

4.03

1996–1997

6.78

1998

12.38

1999–2000

13.68

2001–2002

25.75

2003

26.83

Source: See Appendix for methodology
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suggests that, between 1989 and 1994, Paraguayan production remained below the domestic consumption level
of 3 billion sticks [71]. This rate of production corresponds with TTCs supplies to the illicit market in Brazil
and Argentina, via Paraguay as the transit hub. Between
1995 and 1998, Paraguayan production then grew
exponentially, from 4 billion to over 12 billion sticks
annually, three times the size of Paraguayan domestic consumption. This was also the peak period of TTC supplies
to the illicit market. This pattern suggests Paraguayan
companies shifted to also supplying the illicit market in
competition with TTCs. Between 1999 and 2003, following Brazil’s introduction of the aforementioned export tax
on cigarettes to LAC countries, and the corresponding reduction in TTC supplies, Paraguayan production grew
even further, doubling to almost 27 billion sticks by 2003,
about 8 times domestic consumption. This growth suggests that Paraguayan companies grew in response to an
opportunity to fill a vacuum in an illicit market created
and initially supplied by TTCs.
Table 5 compares volume of imported (Table 3), and
domestically produced cigarettes (Table 4) in Paraguay.
The proportion of Paraguayan cigarettes in the total supply oscillated between 15.2 and 43.5% between 1992 and
1998, jumping to 64.5–69.8% in 2000, and increasing to
87.9–91.8% by 2003. Given approximately 3 billion sticks
annually for domestic consumption [71], it is assumed
the remainder was for export. Table 5 suggests that
TTCs’ concerns in the mid-1990s, that Paraguayan
cigarette manufacturers would take control of the illicit
market in Brazil (as described above) materialised after
the export tax was introduced in in 1999.

Discussion
The above findings contribute new understanding of the
changing nature of the illicit tobacco trade over time, in a
subregion of Latin Amerca [9]. Beginning in the 1960s,
documents suggest TTCs recognised Paraguay as an ideal
transit hub for illegally supplying their international
brands to large markets in neighbouring countries. The
initial objective of TTCs, particularly PMI, was to take
control of domestic cigarette companies in Argentina.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, a period of regional economic downturn, TTCs used Paraguay to establish an
illegal market of lower-priced brands in the subregion.
This paper argues that TTCs, by creating this type of illicit
trade based on their own lower-priced brands, established
the conditions for Paraguayan companies to enter and
flourish. Prior to the 1980s, the Paraguayan tobacco industry had limited capacity and supplied only a relatively
small domestic market. Between 1990 and 1998, cigarette
production in Paraguay increased from less than one billion to twelve billion sticks, with domestic companies
playing the main role in increasing production. In this
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Table 5 The changing role of TTCs and Paraguayan companies
Year

Total cigarette imports from all
trade partners worldwide, as
reported by PGY and exporters,
respectively (billion sticks) (1)

Local cigarette production
(billion sticks) (2)

Total cigarette supply
(billion sticks) (3) = (1) + (2)

Share of Paraguayan production
in total cigarette supply in
Paraguay (%) (4) = (2)/(3)

1989

1.6–0.4

0.3

1.9–0.7

15.8–42.9

1990

1.7–1.4

0.8

2.5–2.2

32–36.4

1991

3.8–4.9

2.2

6–7.1

36.7–31

1992

3.6–7.6

1.5

5.1–9.1

29.4–16.5

1993

3.5–13.2

2.7

6.2–15.9

43.5–17

1994

8.6–16

3.7

12.3–19.7

30.1–18.8

1995

21.8–21.2

4.3

26.1–25.5

16.5–16.9

1996

32.3–19.4

5.8

38.1–25.1

15.2–23.1

1997

35.3–26.2

7.7

43.0–33.9

17.9–22.7

1998

33.9–33.2

12.4

46.3–45.6

26.8–27.2

1999

15.9–10.4

9.4

25.3–19.8

37.2–47.5

2000

9.9–7.8

18.0

27.9–25.8

64.5–69.8

2001

5.9–5.4

28.4

34.3–33.8

82.8–84

2002

4.7–4.5

23.1

27.8–27.6

83.1–83.7

2003

3.7–2.4

26.8

30.5–29.2

87.9–91.8

Sources:Reported cigarette imports: UN Comtrade
Estimated cigarette production: See Appendix for methodology

way, the illicit market established by TTCs encouraged
local companies to transform Paraguay, from a transit hub
to a major supplier of so-called “cheap whites”, defined as
“cigarettes manufactured by legitimate business enterprises with a large share of the production being sold
without all applicable duties paid, usually outside the
jurisdiction where they are produced” [104] (Table 6).
Our findings raise several implications for combating
the illicit tobacco trade and protecting public health.
First, our paper adds further evidence, not only of the
complicity of TTCs in the illicit tobacco trade, but their

culpability in seeding this trade in this subregion and
creating the conditions for other suppliers to flourish.
The BAT documents reviewed in this paper suggest
BAT and PMI established substantial supply and demand
for illicit low-priced cigarettes which, in turn, created
the economic incentives that attracted Paraguayan
manufacturers to eventually compete for this lucrative
market. Current efforts by TTCs to focus attention on
so-called “cheap whites”, produced by these latter manufacturers now competing against them, must be understood within this context. As Ross et al. write:

Table 6 Key moments in the history of Paraguay’s tobacco industry and TTC complicity in the illicit trade
From the 1960s

Paraguay serves as a transit hub for BAT and PMI cigarette smuggling from the US to Argentina and Brazil

Late 1980s - early 1990s

BAT and PMI increase their focus on cheaper brands, paving the way for Paraguay manufacturers to capitalize
on this market

1989–1994

BAT and PMI compete in the illicit market in north-east Argentina

Mid-1990s - late 1990s

BAT and PMI compete in the illicit trade in southern Brazil

1990s

While BAT and PMI increase legal exports of cigarettes from Brazil to Paraguay for them to be smuggled back to Brazil,
they lobby the Brazilian government to lower the excise tax on cigarettes, claiming this would reduce the black
market. Brazil eventually reduces the excise tax per pack from approximately 40% of retail price to about 25% in 1999.

1994

Creation of Tabacalera del Este (Tabesa), soon to become Paraguay’s largest tobacco company and major regional
supplier of illicit cigarettes

1994–1998

Brazil becomes Paraguay’s main source of cigarette imports (4 to 7 times the volume of Paraguayan cigarette
consumption), with Uruguay becoming another major supplier.

From the mid-1990s

Domestic cigarette production and illicit trade out of Paraguay begins to grow (tripled between 1995 and 1998,
doubled between 1999 and 2003 to 27 bn sticks, approximately 8 times total domestic consumption)

1999

Brazil’s 150% export tax on cigarette exports to Latin American countries ends TTC scheme but shifts supply of illicit
trade to Paraguay

Iglesias et al. Globalization and Health

(2018) 14:111

They oppose them not because they are illegal, but
because they represent competition. In addition, TTCs
seem to use the presence of illegal Cheap Whites to
divert attention from their own contribution to the
illegal cigarette market [104].
It is argued here that this culpability of TTCs, in seeding
the illicit tobacco trade in this Latin American sub-region,
reaffirms the need to exclude the industry from measures
to address the illicit tobacco trade.
Second, the findings suggest that understanding the
changing nature of the illicit tobacco trade requires
deeper knowledge of the links between regional and
global trends. In this paper, we have described how
TTCs introduced the illicit trade into a sub-region. The
flourishing of this trade, including the emergence of
Paraguayan manufacturers of illicit cigarettes, has
created a new source of illicit supply to markets far beyond the sub-region. Media reports have identified Paraguayan companies as an increasingly important source of
illicit tobacco products worldwide. In our accompanying
paper (Gomis B, Lee K, Carillo Botero N, Shepherd P, Iglesias R: “We think globally”: the rise of Paraguay’s Tabacalera
del Este as a threat to global tobacco control, forthcoming),
we systematically analyze the rise of the largest of them,
Tabesa, as a threat to global tobacco control. This interconnectedness between regional and global developments is an
important feature of the contemporary illicit tobacco trade.
Third, the paper provides better understanding of the
substantial size of this illicit market and hence the devastating public health consequences for this sub-region.
Poor data has previously hindered the ability to measure
the scale of the illicit trade. Bringing together different
data sources, our findings suggest large volumes of
cheap, untaxed, and largely unregulated cigarettes have
been made available in Argentina and Brazil over decades. The methodology used in this paper to measure
the illicit trade may be usefully applied in other regions
where official data is poor. Our findings notably demonstrate the need to monitor and control key inputs in
cigarette manufacturing – including tobacco leaf,
cigarette paper, and acetate tow – as part of efforts to
tackle the illicit trade globally. Improved data is central
to disentangling the roles of TTCs and other industry
actors in the illicit trade, and a precursor to effectively
implementing the FCTC Protocol to Eliminate Illicit
Trade in Tobacco Products.

Conclusion
TTCs created the conditions that enabled Paraguay to
shift, from transit hub from the 1960s, to a major supplier of illicit cigarettes to the region and beyond from
the mid-1990s. While BAT and PMI sought to further
their interests in Brazil and Argentina through this
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strategy, the unintended consequence was the emergence
of Paraguayan manufacturers focused on filling a vacuum
in the illicit supply chain. The continued growth of domestic tobacco companies in Paraguay since the
mid-2000s, as described in the accompanying paper,
means increasingly important competition for of TTCs in
the region and beyond.

Endnotes
1
The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products of the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) defines illicit
trade as “any practice or conduct prohibited by law and
which relates to production, shipment, receipt, possession,
distribution, sale or purchase including any practice or conduct intended to facilitate such activity” (Article 1).
2
Philip Morris International (PMI) was incorporated as
an operating company of Philip Morris Companies Inc.
in 1987. Because this paper discusses the company’s
international operations, it uses the abbreviation PMI
except for quotations from industry documents which
may use the abbreviation PM.
3
The Southern Common Market (Mercosur) was
established in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay. Venezuela acceded in 2006 and Bolivia in
2015. http://www.mercosur.int
4
According to Merriman (2003), “One method to detect and measure such tactics of tobacco smuggling is to
compare reported tobacco exports destined for a country
to that country’s reported tobacco imports. Persistent
discrepancies between these amounts—discrepancies
that cannot be explained by other factors—provide an
estimate of the amount of wholesale smuggled tobacco.”
(Merriman, D. Understand, Measure, and Combat Tobacco Smuggling. World Bank Economics of Tobacco
Toolkit, Tool 7. 2003. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTPH/Resources/7Smuggling.pdf ).
5
The evolution of the Paraguayan market for foreign
cigarettes should have roughly mirrored that of the GDP
per capita and population, i.e. (1 + 9.8%)*(1 + 8.8%) or a
19.4% increase.
6
La Vencedora transfiere todas sus marcas a British
American Tobacco [LVA closed down in 2002 and sold all
its brands to BAT]. ABC Color, 8 November 2002. http://
www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/la-vencedora
-transfiere-todas-sus-marcas-a-british-american-tobacco671206.html)
Appendix
Methodology for estimating cigarette production in
Paraguay

Paraguay does not have public data on duty-paid cigarette
sales or any other measure of cigarette production. In
order to estimate production in the 1990s and early 2000s,
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we followed the methodology put forth by Corradini
[105], and later used in Biz [106]. The main idea is to use
information on production, or availability of one or several
key inputs for cigarette production in a certain year, and
the proportion of a specific key input used in one unit
(cigarette stick) in that country, to infer total cigarette production. Corradini’s methodology can be summarized by
the following equation:
Estimated cigarette production
¼ production or availability of a key input=
quantity of the input to produce one
cigarette stick [105]
This methodology presents some drawbacks. Notably,
alternative uses of those key inputs may divert available
volumes to other final uses; changes in end-of-year
stocks of those key inputs may not affect the actual
levels of cigarette production in a certain year; and there
may be some measurement errors.
There are several key inputs to be considered with
regard to cigarettes, such as tobacco leaf, filter tow,
and several types of papers used in cigarette production and packaging. Tobacco leaf is the better candidate for production estimation because of its
exclusive use for cigarettes and other tobacco products. In addition, Paraguay imported tobacco leaf almost exclusively for cigarette production in those
years. Filter tow is another key input exclusively dedicated to cigarette production, but the reporting of
trade transactions is often subject to classification
mistakes. In contrast with filter tow and cigarette
paper, one can assume that tobacco leaf, a traditional
and easily identifiable product, was then is subject to
fewer reporting errors. For these reasons, we used tobacco leaf imports as the basis of our production estimates. Paraguay produced some native or dark
tobacco during this period, but these leaves were
mainly exported or used to manufacture other local
tobacco products (i.e., small cigars). In some cases,
dark leaves could have been mixed with tobacco used
for cigarette production, but likely not in those destined for the illicit markets in Brazil or Argentina,
where smokers preferred cigarettes manufactured
from Virginia leaf. For this reason, we excluded local
dark tobacco in our calculations, and in that we differ
with Ramos (2009) [32].
The relationship between the quantity of tobacco
leaves and cigarette production levels also depends on
leaf processing, the types of tobacco mixtures used, and
the average quantity of tobacco mixture used per
cigarette. In the case of Paraguay, UN Comtrade
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provides data for three types of tobacco leaf imports
during the 1990s.
– Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed nor
stripped (HS Code 240110)
– Tobacco, unmanufactured, partly or wholly
stemmed and stripped (HS Code 240120)
– Tobacco refuse (HS Code 240130)
We assumed that all imported tobacco has been cured.
Unmanufactured tobacco, not stemmed nor stripped,
should be processed and the stem should be separated
from the rest of the leaf in order to be used in the tobacco mixture to fill cigarettes. Following Corradini
[105], we estimated that there is an 11% weight loss due
to extraction of the stem. Moreover, we assumed that
stemmed tobacco and tobacco refuse were used in full
for cigarette production. Of course, with a better knowledge of the techniques used in Paraguay in the 1990s, it
will be possible to make more accurate assumptions on
weight losses of imported tobacco leaves during the
preparation of the filler of cigarette sticks.
Finally, following Corradini [105], we assumed that the
average quantity of tobacco filler used in the preparation
of one cigarette stick was 0.83 g. Ramos [32] used 0.65
per stick, assuming an inferior quality of Paraguayan
cigarette production. However, according to some local
specialists, the inferior quality was more likely due to
the higher proportion of tobacco refuse used for the
cigarette filler rather than to a lower amount of tobacco in
an average stick. Since we did not consider the local dark
tobacco production, adjusted import volumes of not
stemmed tobacco (by 11%), and assumed a higher quantity of tobacco filler per stick, our estimations of cigarette
stick production is lower than Ramos [32] for example.
As is the case when illicit activities are involved, there
were significant discrepancies between volumes of tobacco leaf shipped to Paraguay as reported by exporters
and as reported as imports by Paraguay. During the
period analyzed (1989–2003), the countries mainly supplying tobacco leaf were Brazil and Argentina. In the
first half of the 1990s, reported exports of tobacco leaf
from Brazil were lower than reported imports by
Paraguay. After 1995, when Paraguayan firms were increasingly engaged in the illicit market in Brazil, reported imports were lower than reported exports, most
likely for local manufacturers sought to conceal the volume of their operations. As reported exports are more
likely as be diverted to other countries or not exported
at all, we decided to use reported imports by Paraguay.
Using this methodology, Table 7 describes volume
of reported leaf imports adjusted for processing requirements, and the estimated cigarette production
(assuming 0.83 g of tobacco filler per stick).
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Table 7 Tobacco leaf imports reported by Paraguay, and
estimated cigarette production, 1989–2003
Imported tobacco
leaf availability for
cigarette production

Estimated cigarette
production

Year-on-year
increase

Metric tonnes

Billion cigarettes

Billion cigarettes

1989

231

0.3

N/A

1990

689

0.8

0.55

1991

1790

2.2

1.33

1992

1265

1.5

−0.63

1993

2220

2.7

1.15

1994

3101

3.7

1.06

1995

3590

4.3

0.59

1996

4852

5.8

1.52

1997

6408

7.7

1.87

1998

10,278

12.4

4.66

1999

7802

9.4

−2.98

2000

14,909

18

8.56

2001

23,601

28.4

10.47

2002

19,138

23.1

−5.38

2003

22,272

26.8

3.78

Source: UN Comtrade. Positions 240110-240120-240130. Volumes of 240110
were adjusted by -11%, the rest of tobacco leaves entered without losses in
the tobacco fill
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